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Resumen: Cuando las empresas oligopólicas compiten invirtiendo tanto en I+D 
para reducir costos, como en publicidad creadora de demanda, su com-
promiso estratégico en dichas inversiones puede diferir notablemente 
del que tendrían si sólo utilizaran alguna de ellas. En particular, si el 
gasto en I+D (y en publicidad) se compromete con anterioridad a la 
elección del nivel de producción, pueden surgir casos de infrainversión 
en reducción de costos, y otros en los que no existe utilización estratég-
ica diferenciada del I+D. Además, cuando la publicidad es una variable 
de inversión más de las empresas, el gasto en I+D que realizan puede 
igualar o superar el nivel socialmente óptimo de reducción de costos. 
Abstract: When oligopolistic firms compete by investing simultaneously in cost-
reducing R&D and in demand-creating advertising expenditures, their 
strategic commitment in such assets may differ qualitatively from the 
behavior pursued when only one of them is used. In particular, if 
R&D (and advertising) investment is decided on and made public be-
fore selecting the output, then cases of undercommitment in cost re-
duction can arise despite the non-existence of technological spillovers; 
and others in which there is no room for a differentiated strategic use 
of R&D. Furthermore, when advertising is included among the invest-
ment variables of firms, their R&D expenses may equal or even exceed 
the socially optimal level of cost reduction. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely known that a great part of industrial organization litera-
ture on strategic precommitment games has focused on the analysis 
of oligopolistic competition modeled as a two-stage game with the 
usual timing. At the first stage or premarket phase, each player 
commits itself to some sunk investment (long-run variable), which 
is made observable before the quantity (or price) setting and then 
modifies Cournot-in-quantity (or Bertrand-in-price) behavior at the 
second phase or market stage (short-run variable). In this phase, 
a Nash equilibrium emerges given the inherited conditions coming 
from the first stage of the game. In fact, subgame perfection (Sel¬
ten, 1975) requires the second stage actions to be a Nash equilibrium 
in this phase for all possible actions adopted in the first stage, i.e., 
for every subgame. Put in another way, it is supposed that firms 
correctly anticipate the effects of the rival first-stage actions on the 
second stage equilibrium no matter where they are in the game. 
In the framework above described two issues complete the mode-
lization. On the one hand, the role of sunk costs and public observabi-
lity in some actions are critical for determining the rules of the game, 
as well as the economic performance. The second feature is the recog-
nizition of how each firm can acquire a strategic advantage over its 
rivals through a sunk investment. For that, such strategic competition 
models adopt the one-stage game (myopic competition), in which 
the entire set of decisions is simultaneously chosen by each firm, as 
a benchmark for characterizing over or underinvestment patterns in 
such irreversible assets. 
Since the seminal work of Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), Ware 
(1984) and others scholars in exploring the strategic entry deterrence 
problem, there have been a lot of contributions in this research field 
offering several stylized facts. The common idea in all of them is 
the recognition, more or less explicit, that the degree of flexibility 
of firms, in the sense of a higher or lower slope of their cost and/or 
demand functions, affects the nature and the performance of compe-
tition among such firms in the respective industry. 
Briefly, in a symmetric duopoly in which firms produce a substi-
tute good and play the two-stage game r((«i), <?,), ¿=1,2, -i.e., they 
compete by first committing themselves to an unalterable publicly ob-
servable cost-reducing R&D expenditure, uh and then picking output 
levels, qi- firms spend more resources on cost reduction than in the 
one-stage game T{UU ?i) -in which R&D and output choices are simul-
taneously set- for a low enough degree of technological spillovers (see A COURNOT SETTING  5 
Brander and Spencer, 1983; De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991).
1 The 
intuition behind this result is simple. When firms act in a strategic 
competition framework, each one aims to make the output-setting of 
its competitor less aggressive. So, given that the cost-reducing effort 
of each firm increases the marginal profitability of its own output, 
and that outputs of both firms are strategic substitutes (see Bulow, 
Geanokoplos and Klemperer, 1985),
2 the so-called (positive) 'strategic 
effect'
3 entails the adoption of a 'top dog' behavior in cost reduction 
(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). As a result, firms' output levels 
are higher than in the one-stage game, the price of goods is lower 
than in the one-stage game, and firms' profits are also lower because 
of the higher level of fixed (sunk) costs undertaken by them. On the 
other hand, a 'lean and hungry' look with respect to the investment in 
R&D is adopted by firms (to induce weak competition at the product 
market) if a high enough degree of technological spillovers prevails in 
cost reduction investments. 
In the same line and from the social point of view, D'Aspremont 
and Jacquemin (1988) state that in the one-stage game F(uit 9i) firms' 
investment in cost reduction is lower than that of a social planner, 
whose aim is the maximization of total surplus, given the existing 
market structure. This outcome is even true in the two-stage frame-
work r((ui),qi), despite the overinvestment in cost reduction with 
respect to the r(uitqi) game. The explanation for this conclusion 
lies in the fact that firms, when they choose their R&D expenditures, 
ignore any (positive) effect of cost reduction on the consumer surplus. 
Things work similarly when it is advertising expenditure rather 
than cost-reducing effort that is the sunk cost of firms. In fact, if 
advertising expenses increase the marginal willingness to pay for the 
advertiser's product, then the optimal behavior of firms depends on 
1 See result 1, further on, for the particular case of zero technological spillover. 
2 In fact, if firm i increases its output, then not only does its marginal revenue 
decrease but so does firm fs. This is because marginal revenue is an increas-
ing function of price, which, in turn, is a decreasing function of total output. 
Nevertheless, this is not an entirely generalizable result, since when the demand 
function is convex (as in the case of an isoelastic demand function, for example), 
both output levels can be strategic complements for some values of the domain of 
the best reply functions. Particularly, if the output level of each firm is sufficiently 
low, the best each one can do when faced with an increase in the rival's output is 
to increase its own output. 
3 That is, an increase in firm is R&D reduces j's output level, which entails 
an increase in firm t's output level and thus increases firm i's profit level (see the 
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whether advertising is of cooperative or competitive type in the sense 
of Friedman (1983).
4 Particularly, when each Cournot firm carries out 
a very cooperative advertising, i.e., when it acts upon total sales,
5 the 
rival becomes tougher at the market subgame and, as a result, under-
commitment in advertising is strategically indicated. Output level is 
then lower than in the one-stage game, and prices of goods are also 
lower, but profits of firms are higher because of the underinvestment 
in sunk costs. On the other hand, when advertising is not very co-
operative, independent or predatory, i.e., when it acts upon market 
share,
6 the negative marginal effect of the advertising of each firm 
on its rival's market share gives rise to aggressive competition at the 
product market. This allows each firm to increase its profits at the 
expense of its rival, by which the incentive to overadvertise is clear. 
In his turn, it leads to higher output and price levels, although firms' 
profits are lower because of the larger sunk costs in advertising. 
Once more from a social welfare point of view, the level of ad-
vertising expenditure chosen in a one-stage game as F(ai} qi) is too 
small when its effect on market size is sufficiently high, and too high 
when its dominant effect is upon market share. This is because of its 
component of public good in the former case, and its use to divide up 
the market in the latter. This pattern is still more clear in the two-
stage setting r((oi), qi) when advertising is very cooperative or very 
competitive, and, conversely, is attenuated in the intermediate cases, 
since the additional effect considered by firms under the two-stage 
framework of rivalry is the impact of advertising on market size. 
Summing up, the analytical effort expended in the field of pre-
commitment games to try to compare the predictions of two-stage 
vs. one-stage models of a single investment variable (in the spirit 
of Pudenberg and Tirole, 1984) has been considerable. Nevertheless, 
such models do not allow the use of several investment weapons, in 
order to determine whether, when their joint use is possible, the opti-
mal behavior in each may differ from the optimal behavior when only 
one single type of investment is employed separately. As Kreps and 
Spence (1985) state: 
"Competition in reality is over many variables or in many dimensions 
at once. These analysis are extremely useful in focusing our attention on the 
4 See result 2, further on. 
5 As happens in the cigarette industry (Roberts and Samuelson, 1988). 
6 As occurs in the saltine crakers industry (Slade, 1995) and in the soft-drink 
market (Gasmi et al, 1992). A COURNOT SETTING  7 
nature of competition in a single variable, but one wonders whether the nature of 
competition in one variable is not affected by what is happening with regard to a 
second. We despair of anyone's ability to model adequately the rich structure of 
realistic competition, and we therefore endorse the idea of studying one variable 
at a time. But there is a significant potential flaw in this method of analysis that 
should be kept in mind", (p. 353). 
This type of criticism about the use of single investment models 
to stylize generic industrial behavior seems doubtless to be a good 
reason to develop models with several (more than one) investment 
variables at the disposal of firms. Clearly, in such a context, there 
are the same '(direct-) strategic effects' as in the single investment 
framework, but there are also complementarity (or substitutability) 
relationships between such variables, which cause 'indirect-strategic 
effects' that must also be taken into account. The reason is that these 
'indirect-strategic effects' may place the firms' optimal investment in 
a level far different from the optimal conduct that holds when only 
one single long-run variable can be used. In fact, the introduction 
of several (more than one) investment variables is crucial, since it 
may give some additional degree of flexibility to firms and, as a con-
sequence, lead to some important modifications in the conduct and 
the performance of firms. Put in other words, this brings together 
two strands of literature on industrial organization: one that looks at 
the (direct-) strategic effect of firms' investments, and the other that 
looks at the contemporaneous interaction between several investment 
variables. Clearly, one of the crucial goals in this- context is to dis-
tinguish, in the 'total-strategic effect' of a given variable, what is due 
to the role of that variable ('direct-strategic effect') from what is due 
to the interaction of such a variable with others ('indirect-strategic 
effect'). 
The aim of this paper then is to examine the circumstances un-
der which the interaction effect between contemporaneous variables 
is strong enough to reverse the (direct-) strategic commitment effect. 
For that, I consider a duopoly in which firms compete by means of a 
cost-reducing investment with no technological spillovers, a demand-
creating investment that intends to enhance consumer tastes for a 
certain product (the advertised good) and that may or may not af-
fect the demand for the product of the rival,
7 and the quantities of 
7 With such variables I intend to model the combination of the two basic forms 
of competition used by firms: cost leadership and differentiation of its product 
from that of its rival. 8 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
output.
8 Next, results for the two-stage competition r((uiiai), 9i) -
where R&D and advertising are the long-run variables (and each firm 
expects that the levels chosen by its rival will remain unchanged at the 
second stage), leaving output as the short-run variable- are compared 
with those for the one-stage regime T(ui, au qi), in which all three vari-
ables are simultaneously set. As we will see further on, interaction 
between both irreversible assets shows that strategic over- or under-
commitment in each one does not depend only on the 'direct-strategic 
effect' as happens in the case of just a single long-run variable, but 
also on a new 'indirect-strategic effect', which may dramatically al-
ter the commitment patterns mentioned above. Likewise, the socially 
eficient levels of investment in each asset can be reached under given 
circumstances in this several investments framework. 
The rest of the paper runs as follows. In section 2 the model is 
built. In section 3 results for the two-stage game T((ui, a*), qi) of com-
petition are compared with those for the one-stage regime T(ui, ait qi). 
Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of firms' behavior in R&D and ad-
vertising as compared with those of a social planner. Finally, section 
5 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper. Formal proofs of 
the results are collected in the appendix. 
2. The model 
Consider a differentiated symmetric duopoly in which firms i and j, 
i = 1, 2; j = 3 - i, compete by choosing R&D and advertising levels, 
and by setting the quantity of their products. In order to lead to 
explicit solutions, we specify particular demand and cost functions. 
Regarding demand schedule, it is supossed that there is a contin-
uum of consumers with quasilinear preferences defined by the utility 
function: 
U(qi, q2; ai, o2; 9o) = «(«1, <?25 a1( o2) + q0, (1) 
where 9l and q2 denote quantities of the consumption goods 1 and 
2, respectively, ax and a2 are persuasive advertising expenses made 
by firms 1 and 2, and q0 is the quantity of a numeraire good. Utility 
8 In industries such as seasonal clothing and automobiles, firms' conduct is 
probably correctly described by the Coumot rule, since they tend to commit 
themselves to production runs and then sell the output for whatever they can get 
for it. A COURNOT SETTING  9 
on the quantities of the products and on the associated advertising 
levels is quadratic, as: 
«(<?l, 92! «l, o2) = (a + 0Ol - \a2)qi + (a - Aaj + 6a2)q2 (2) 
-^9? +
 279i92 +/3<?2)> 
where parameters a, ¡3, 7, B and A satisfy a > 0, ¡3 > 7 > 0, 6 > 0 and 
A e (-M)-
9 
The properties of the parameters of the utility function given in 
(2) ensure that consumers' demand for each product is well-defined. 
In fact, maximizing {!/(•) -p1<Zl -p2?2} subject to (91,92) ¥ (0,0) 
and the budget constraint piqi + p2q2 + 90 = where I stands for 
the consumer's income, yields the system of linear inverse demand 
functions: 
Pi{ai,aJ;qi,qj)= max.{a + 0Oi - Xaj - (3q, - iqj, 0}, (3) 
¿=1,2; j = 3 - », 
where Pi and Pj denote unitary prices for products. 
The expenditure on advertising made by each firm has two effects 
measured by parameters 9 and A. The parameter 6 captures the effect 
of its advertising expenditure on its own product, i.e., the increment 
in the marginal willingness to pay for its product. On the other hand, 
the parameter A reflects the cross-effect of advertising on the rival's 
product and indicates the degree to which one firm's advertising, by 
comparing its product with that of its rival's, affects the marginal 
willingness to pay for the latter. 
By inverting the system of equations given in (3), it follows that 
advertising made by each firm increases demand for its own product 
and may increase (in the case of cooperative advertising) or decrease 
(in the case of predatory or competitive advertising) demand for the 
rival's product (Friedman, 1983).
1
0
 The threshold value 
A* = -le 
9 As can be seen, consumer preferences are not given, but they change with 
advertising. Indeed, a + 6^ - Xaj can be understood as the consumer's reser-
vation price for each good % = 1, 2; j = 3 - i. It is thus, in a sense, a measure of 
the market size for such a product. 
1
0
 See also Chiplin and Sturgess (1981). 10 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
is important, since it separates cooperative advertising from preda-
tory or competitive advertising. Specifically, it is said to be coop-
erative if A G (-61, A*), independent if A = A*, and predatory if 
A € (A\6>). Finally, the condition A G (-9,9) rules out cases of 
perfectly cooperative and perfectly competitive advertising. Hence, a 
symmetric increase in both advertising expenditures shifts each resid-
ual demand curve outwards and, as a result, the price-elasticity of de-
mand falls (in absolute value) at every price (see Dixit and Norman, 
1978; Spence, 1980; Chiplin and Sturgess, 1981; Friedman, 1983; Fer-
shtman, 1984). 
On the other hand, the R&D investment undertaken by each firm 
shifts variable (and marginal) costs of output to fixed (sunk) costs 
(Brander and Spencer, 1983). In particular, I assume that all firms 
possess the production technology described by the cost function: 
Ci(i<;tii,a<)=(m-tti)9i + *«i+wo?1 ¿=1,2, (4) 
where m > 0 is the marginal (and average) cost of output in the 
absence of any cost-reducing expenditure, and <f> > 0 and u > 0 are 
parameters denoting the productive efficiency (in the increase of the 
output) of investments in R&D and advertising, respectively. There 
are no technological spillovers in the cost-reducing effort. 
As usual, I look for a Nash equilibrium of the one stage game 
r(wi,oi)?i), and for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-
stage game T((ui, ai), qi). All through the paper, equilibrium levels 
in the former game will be labeled by a bar "-"and equilibrium values 
in the latter by a cap "A". 
To ensure inferiority and stability of both equilibria, the following 
two technical assumptions are made: 
Al. Firm i's marginal (and average) cost of output when there 
is no R&D expenditure, m, is "moderate"in such a way that 
20a 
< m < a 
20+j 
A2. R&D and advertising cost parameters, <j> anduj, respectively, 
satisfy the condition fa > <f> 
max. 
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Assumption Al is a regularity condition which guarantees that 
the cost-reducing level of equilibrium of one-stage and two-stage ga-
mes, Ui and ii, respectively, are such that 0 < Ui < m and 0 < < 
m. In turn, assumption A2 ensures the strict concavity of the payoff 
function of each player in both games, i.e., it ensures that the solutions 
of games r(ui, ait 9i) and r((ui, 04), qi) are unique and stable (and, a 
fortiori, that the first order necessary conditions (FONCs, hereafter) 
are sufficient). In particular, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the 

















daf du] duidujdujdui 
> 0 
> 0, 
where gi (gj, respectively) denotes the reduced or long-run payoff 
function for firm i (j, respectively). These condition, together with 
the condition ensuring the uniqueness of the equilibrium in game 
r(uj,ail9i), are contained in assumption A2.
 1
1 
3. The game F((ui, en), qi) compared with the game T{uit ait qi) 
Before examining the framework in which there are several investment 
variables in the strategy space of firms, it is worth taking as a baseline 
the two limit cases already mentioned in the Introduction. These 
cases replicate previous findings on optimal commitment when there 




 The firms' pattern in cost reduction is formally 
summarized in the following result. 
\ 
RESULT 1. (The game r((ui),«i) vs. the game r(uilit)). If m = 0, 
then ^ > Ui and q{ > qt (as well as n < Pi and ^ < TTJ, i = 1, 2. 
1
1
 Henriques (1990) shows that in the two-stage game, the second order con-
ditions of the first stage are not sufficient to ensure stability in this stage. Such 
stability is ensured by assumption 2. 
1
2
 These results are both in fact particular cases of proposition 3 (see corollary 
1, further on). Obviously, in such situations, assumptions Al and A2 have to be 
adapted to each particular case. 12 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
In general, the induction of a less aggressive rival at the market stage 
is profitable for each Cournot firm, which is internalized in the compe-
tition developed as a two-stage game. Hence, the re-allocation process 
from variable (and marginal) production costs to fixed costs benefits 
each firm since its output level increases as a result, whereas that of 
the rival falls. This is the so-called (positive) 'direct-strategic effect'. 
As was explained in the introduction, firms therefore spend more re-
sources on cost reduction in the two-stage game than in the one-stage 
game, which parallels the overcommitment in cost-reducing shown in 
previous contributions in this field (see Brander and Spencer, 1983; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984; Krouse, 1990). 
Likewise, firms' behavior in demand-creating advertising is for-
mally stylized as follows. 
RESULT 2. (The game r((o,), qi) vs. the game r(ait Suppose that 
Ui = 0, and let 
2/3 
a) If\< X*, then a* < a* and qi < qi (as well as pi < n and 
Hi > Si), ¿=1,2; 
b) IfX> X\ then all the above inequalities are reversed; 
c) If X = A *, there is no room for a differentiated strategic use 
of the advertising. 
A strategic undercommitment in demand-creating advertising by 
each firm, i.e., the adoption of a 'lean and hungry' advertising look, 
is desirable when advertising is very cooperative, in the sense that 
A < A*, as part a) of result 2 shows. In such a case, the two effects 
of the advertising undertaken by a given firm are an increase in its 
own output, and an increase in the rival's output. Since the latter 
is the dominant effect of the two, each firm finds that it is profitable 
to underadvertise. As a result, firms' output is lower than in the 
one-stage game, as well as the price of goods. The threshold value of 
parameter A separating the two situations -advertising that increases 
the rival's output from advertising that decreases the rival's output-
which is 
A' = -l9 
in the one-stage game (in which the output of equilibrium of each 
firm is not a function of the advertising expenditure previously made 
by the rival), changes to the value A COURNOT SETTING  13 
in the two-stage game. Accordingly, in the interval A e (A*, A*) each 
firm's advertising increases the rival's market share in the two-stage 
game and this (negative) effect outweighs the (positive) effect due to 
the increase in the market size. 
The contrary holds when parameter A is such that A > A*, in 
which case any investment in advertising reduces the rival's market 
share. This leads each firm to behave as a 'fat cat' in the advertising 
budget, as part b) of result 2 shows (see Pudenberg and Tirole, 1984). 
Turning back to the two-investment variable setting, if neither 
R&D nor advertising expenditures are publicly observable, then the 
duopolists play the one-stage game T{ui, ait qi). From (3) and (4), 
the short-run payoff function for each player comes straightforward. 
In fact, it is given by: 
7Ti(•) = (a - m + dai - \aj - pqi - 7gj + ui)qi (5) 
-(f>u
2-ua
2, ¿=1,2; j = 3-i, 
and the FONCs for a Nash equilibrium in this game are 






5^ = 0, ¿=1,2 (8) 
dqi ' ' 
Resolution of the system of equations given by (6), (7) and (8) 
gives rise to the following proposition, which describes the firms' be-
havior in the absence of any strategic commitment. 
PROPOSITION 1. Under assumptions Al and A2, a unique and inte-
rior Nash equilibrium of the one-stage game.T(uit ah qi) exist and is 
defined as 
0 — 771 I 
9i)= —Q — (u>M,2«>4) >, i= 1,2, 14 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
where 6 = 2(2/3 + 7)u>0 - 6(6 - \)<j> - to. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
In this regime of competition, two facts need to be underlined. 
First, firms cannot acquire any strategic advantage from their (uu Oj)-
investments because they cannot modify the (future) market behavior 
of the rival. Thus, they only consider the 'direct effects' of such invest-
ments on their own profits. Second, the advertising and R&D invest-
ments of each firm are strategic complements, in the sense that expen-
diture on one is encouraged by expenditure on the other (see Chiplin 
and Sturgess, 1981; Fershtman, 1984; Hula, 1988; Lunn, 1989). 
On the other hand, when firms commit themselves to publicly 
observable investments before quoting output levels, then the two-
stage game r((Ui, a,), q{) is played. In the output game, the Nash-in-
quantity equilibrium is denned by FONCs (8), i.e., the strategies that 
maximize profits of each firm at the market stage of the game, given 
the sunk investments. This results in: 
! &(•) = 4^23^2 K
Q -
 mK
2^ " T) + 2/ÍUi - 7«i (9) 
J, i =1,2; j =  +(2/30 + 7A)ai - (2/3 A + 7<?)o,] \,i=l,2 
as such an equilibrium. 
From the pair of Cournot-Nash strategies given in (9), firm is 
long-run (or reduced) profit function applicable at the first stage of 
the game can be written as: 
9i{-) = PÌQi(-)\
2 ~ <K
2 - wo?, ¿=1,2, (10) 
and the FONCs defining the equilibrium in such a stage are given by: 
dai diri 8TTÌ ddj , . 
0=—= —- H - — , (11) 
dui dui dqj dui
 K ' 
and 
{)=^9j_^^ULJt^i^l^ ¿=1,2; j = 3-i, (12) 
ddi dcti dqj ddi 
where the envelope theorem is used. In short, firms' behavior in the 
entire game r((Ui, a,), 9i) is summarized in the following proposition. A COURNOT SETTING  15 
PROPOSITION 2. // assumptions Al and A2 hold, then a unique 
and interior subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game 
T((ui, oi), qi) exists and is given by 
\ ((«,,30,*) = ^-^((2p
2u>,p(2p9 + 7A)<6), (4/3
2 - 7
2)o/0) I, 




PROOF. See the appendix. 
When firms' investments are precommitted, they have the same 
non-strategic or direct effects -reinforced solely by the complementar-
ity between both assets- as in the one-stage game. In addition, each 
one of these investments has a 'total-strategic effect' that is composed 
by a 'direct-strategic effect' and an 'indirect-strategic effect' through 
the behavior in the other investment. Specifically, the 'total-strategic 
effect' of cost-reducing effort is formally given by: 
d^du~\dv~ daij' 
1 2- 3 %,  (13) 
where u) denotes the R&D best response function of player j, which 
is defined by FONC 
^£ = 0. 
dUj 
In the same way, the 'total-strategic effect' of demand-creating 
advertising budget is given by: 
d^d^fdal days 
Bqjdaj \dai duij' ' '
 3 '
 { ' 
where a] denotes the profit-maximizing level of advertising expendi-
tures of firm j, which is determined by FONC 
The difference in the optimum levels of investments between the 
game r((u4, ot), qi) and the game r^a^) is reflected in the fol-
lowing proposition. 16 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that assumptions AI and A2 hold, and let 
x*=_J_g *_ (3(8-X)X (3X 
2(3 '
 W (2/3 + 7)7 ^ (2/3 + 7) (2/3A + 76*)' 
Then behavior of firms in terms of cost reduction and demand creation 
is as follows. 
1) If X < X", as well as: 
a) to < w" and <j> < 4>", then Ui < ^ and a, < ai; 
b) co = w* and ^ < 4>", then Ui = u{ and a, < ai; 
c) w> 10*, then Hi > «, and a, | Hi (depending on whether 
<$> f 0*. 
2) IfX = X*, thenu, f Ui (depending on LO f to*, respectively) and 
ai < Hi. 
3) If X > X*, then Ui > Ui and hi > au i = 1, 2. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 
Proposition 3 constitutes one of the two main results of the paper. 
It shows that the 'indirect-strategic effects', derived from interaction 
(complementarity) of an investment variable with the other, may be 
strong enough to reverse the sign of 'direct-strategic effects' of each 
investment. In fact, undercommitment in cost reduction -as part la) 
of proposition 3 indicates- is rational when demand-creating advertis-
ing is cooperative enough, and advertising and R&D are both highly 
efficient in the increase of the output. The intuition behind this con-
clusion is as follows. When firms play strategically, each firm i wants 
to affect fs conduct at the market subgame by reducing the marginal 
profitability of both types of investments, Uj and aj. Clearly, levels 
of Ui and uj are strategic substitutes, i.e., 







 > ' 
which results in overinvestment in cost reduction with respect to the 
one-stage game, Ui > m. Furthermore, in this case, a{ and u, are 
strategic complements, i.e., 
B-Kj dgj du* dxl dqj d
2
9j when X P ( — 9 — —o\ 
dqj duj dai dqj duj dujdai ' \ ' 2/3 )' 
So, each firm has an incentive to underadvertise, ai < au which, 
in turn, decreases the marginal profitability of its R&D expenditure A COURNOT SETTING  17 
and therefore reduces the incentive to overcommit in such an asset. 
Indeed, if the productive efficiency of advertising expenditures is high 
enough, then the sign of equation (13) may become positive, i.e., 
Üi < ü¿. 
On the other hand, levels of advertising expenditures, o¿ and a¡, 
are strategic complements, i.e., 
dnt dq-j da* diti dq, d
2
gi „ , / 7 \ 
dqjdajda, dq3 daj dajdüi \ ' 20 J 
and this constitutes an incentive to underadvertise, o¿ < o¿. Further-
more, in this case, ux and aj are strategic substitutes, i.e., 




 = d~q~da~ dajdut
 > °' 
which gives each firm an incentive to overcommit in cost reduction, 
ut > üi. In his turn, it is this overcommitment in cost reduction that 
provides an incentive to overadvertise. In fact, if the efficiency of R&D 
is high enough and that of advertising is sufficiently low, then the 
incentive to underadvertise arising from the 'direct-strategic effect' 
is outweighed by the incentive to overadvertise emerging from its 
combined use with a cost reduction investment. As a result, we have 
ài > au even for a very cooperative type of advertising, as part lc) 
of the proposition shows. Parts 2 and 3 have a similar interpretation. 
Finally, the following corollary can be shown fairly simply from 
proposition 3. 
COROLLARY 1. Result 1 (respectively, result 2) follows from proposi-
tion 3 by taking the limit when w (respectively, <j>) tends to infinite. 
This corollary parallels the conclusions of Brander and Spencer 
(1983), Fudenberg and Tiróle (1984), and Krouse (1990) for the uni-
dimensional cases of strategic investment. 
4. Welfare results 
It is well known that the cost-reduction processes of firms benefit con-
sumers, since the final price they pay for the goods falls, whereas in-
vestments of firms in demand-creation harm them due to the increase 
in the price of the output that they lead to. In addition, oligopolistic 
competition developed as in games T(ui,qi) and F((ui),qi) leads to a 
lower level of cost reduction than the social welfare maximizing level 18 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(fb). Thus, Hi < u{
b and < u{
b, for i = 1, 2 (see D'Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988). Likewise, games as T(ai, 9i) and T((ai),qi) give 
rise to a greater amount of demand-creating advertising than the so-
cial welfare maximizing level when such an advertising is predatory. 
Namely, Hi > a{
b and en > a{
b. 
These findings nevertheless raise the important question of whe-
ther they depend critically on the simultaneous choice of both ex-
penditures. In this section, the consequences on market performance 
of considering the complementarity between demand-creating adver-
tising and cost-reducing R&D expenditures are investigated. In this 
setting of cost-demand interaction, I also consider the behavior of a 
duopoly socially managed, in order to compare such a behavior with 
investment levels in a non-cooperative regime. 
With respect to the first question, the comparative statics of the 
equilibrium price of goods in both games shows us that there are 
conditions under which demand-creating effort may be procompeti¬
tive, as well as conditions under which cost-reducing effort may be 
anticompetitive. This is the spirit of next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 4. Under assumptions Al and A2 values of parameters 
that measure productive efficiency of advertising and RSzD expendi-
tures exist, respectively 
. (9(9-X) (3(2/39+ 1X)(9-X)
>1 . 1 
u> = rmn. < — -, —T. 7T- — > and 4> = ——, 
\2(/3 + 7) (4/3
2-7
2)(/3 + 7) J 2(3' 
such that the following holds: 
a) If 4> <<t>*, then a reduction in to decreases the price of goods, 
b) Ifu <u*, then a reduction in 4> increases the price of goods. 
This conclusion holds by differentiating the price strategy in each 
equilibrium with respect to parameters u> (case a) and <$> (case b). The 
result states that regardless of whether competition is developed in a 
one-stage or in a two-stage game, a reduction in the cost of advertising 
investment may reduce the final price of goods, as part a) of the 
proposition states. This is true when the productive efficiency of the 
cost-reducing investment is high enough. The explanation of this 
conclusion lies on the fact that the advertising effect on the price of 
goods through the (higher) R&D investment outweighs the advertising 
effect on the price through the (higher) output level. In the same way, 
if advertising is highly efficient, then a reduction in the cost of R&D A COURNOT SETTING 19 
investment causes such an increase in the advertising expenditure 
that its (positive) effect on price outweighs the (negative) effect on 
price due to the higher level of output. Thus, the price of the output 
increases, as part b) of proposition 4 shows. 
On the other hand, investment patterns of firms cn > a{
b and 
Oi > a[
b, for an advertising encouraging consumers to switch their 
purchases from one brand to another (when there is no cost reduction 
effort), as well as uf < u
fb and fij < u?
b (when there is no advertising), 
may also be reversed when both cost-reducing and demand-creating 
expenditures are used simultaneously by firms. This is the message 
of the following proposition, which compares the investment behavior 
of a duopoly (in one-stage and two-stage games) with the investment 
behavior of a socially managed duopoly. 
PROPOSITION 5. When assumptions Al and A2 hold, the following 
occurs: 
1) Values of parameters X,u and 4> exist, namely 
0 (9 — X)X X 





 = ~2\B0-(2B + >v\\V 
such that, in the one-stage game T(ui, ait g4), 
a)IfX<= (A, fi),u = w and <t> <4>, then = u{
b and 0i > a{
b; 
bJIfXG (X,0),u > w and <f> = 4>, then Uj < u{
b and ai = a{
b. 
2) Values of parameters X,u, and 4> exist, namely 
> _ 4/3
3-2/37




















such that, in the two-stage game T((ui, a;), qi), 
a) IfX£ (X,9),u = u and <j> < 4>, then iij = u{
b and o4 > a{
b, 
b) If X € (A,0),w > Q> and <t> = 4>, then Ui < u{
b and a< = 
af, ¿=1,2. 
PROOF. See the appendix. 20 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
This is the other main result of the paper. Conditions under 
which advertising encourages the level of cost-reduction undertaken 
in a non-cooperative setting until that one maximizing the social wel-
fare are: a very competitive advertising, a highly efficient advertising 
investment (in the increasing of the output), and a highly efficient 
R&D investment (in the increasing of the output). The intuition 
is that when advertising is predatory firms tend to advertise more 
deeply than the social welfare maximizing level, and this reinforces 
the complementarity relationship between advertising and R&D ex-
penses when both are efficient enough. Thus, the existence of adver-
tising in the investment space of firms and its complementarity with 
R&D expenses leads to a welfare-improving increase in the effort on 
cost reduction. 
Similarly, the combination of cost-reducing R&D expenditures 
with demand-creating advertising may lead duopolistic firms to re-
duce their levels of predatory advertising in such a way that they 
pick the same level as that of a socially managed duopoly. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In a Cournot setting with no technological spillovers in cost reduc-
tion investments, an undercommitment to cost-reducing R&D may be 
rational with the fact that firms are engaging in more investment 
variables than R&D (the expenditures on demand-creating advertis-
ing, for instance). This paper has examined this issue in a two-stage 
model and compared the results obtained with those of a one-stage 
game. In the former, firms choose a level of cost-reducing effort si-
multaneously with a level of demand-creating advertising at the first 
stage and then they set the quantities of output at the second phase. 
In the latter, all variables are chosen simultaneously. Despite the lack 
of technological nitrations in the cost-reducing expenditure, overin-
vestment in R&D is not the only possible behavior emerging from the 
two-stage setting (with respect to the one-stage game) as occurs when 
cost-reducing effort is the firms' sole investment. Indeed, there are 
values of the parameters measuring the spillover effect of advertising 
and the efficiency of advertising and R&D expenditures that eliminate 
the possibility of using strategically the cost-reducing investment (i. 
e. in a different amount than in the one-stage game). In the same 
way, undercommitment in cost-reducing R&D is possible. 
' Regarding the behavior on advertising that boosts the demand 
for the advertised product, its combination with an R&D investment A COURNOT SETTING 21 
leads firms to overadvertise when investment in cost reduction is 
highly efficient and expenditures in advertising are low efficient, for 
even a cooperative or a low predatory type of advertising. 
Finally, the interaction between cost-reducing and demand-creat-
ing efforts also allows us to clarify the role played by each variable on 
market performance in a setting of several investments. In particular, 
and depending on parameters of the model, a decrease in the cost 
of advertising may produce lower prices of the output, whereas a 
decrease in the cost of R&D may be followed by higher prices of goods. 
In addition, advertising may be socially beneficial, since it restores 
the first best level of cost-reducing investment. In the same way, the 
existence of a cost-reducing expenditure in the investment space of 
firms may cause the advertising effort of each one (when it is very 
predatory) to coincide with the level chosen by a social planner. 
As a general conclusion, these findings show that there are gro-
unds for arguing that the consideration of possible complementarities 
in the investment space of firms has particular significance to evaluate 
their strategic commitments. Otherwise, we may incur in an excessive 
risk of offering patterns of behavior far different from the firms' real 
conduct. 
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Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION i. Each firm i chooses the level of uu ah and 
qi to maximize profits. From its payoff function, given by equation (5) 
in the text, the FONCs defining a Nash equilibrium, given in equations 
(6), (7), and (8) in the text, are: 
qi-2(t>Ui = 0 (6-) 
09i-2wai = O (7.) 
and 
a-m-\-dai-\aj-2ßqi-^qj + ui = Q i= 1,2; j = 3 - i. (8') 
The existence and uniqueness of the solution {(^,5^)} are 
proved by solving the system of equations given in (6'), (7') and (8'). 
The description of the equilibrium is completed with the price of each 
good, which is given by 
2(q/3 + m(ß + 7))w0 - m9{6 -\)4>-w 
Pi =  Q 
and the profit level 
for each firm i 
The stability of such an equilibrium is proved by inspection of the 
Hessian of function TT* with respect to R&D, advertising, and output 
strategies. 
For inferiority of {uu a*)-strategies, 0 < Ui(u>,0) < m and 0 < 
ai(u>,4>) must hold. That 0 < Ui(w,0) and 0 < Oiiw.tf) follows 
from assumption Al, by which m < a. So, it remains to prove that 
Ui(u>,4>) < m, which holds since the gradient of Ui{u,<j>) is nonzero 
by assumption A2. Then, sup. Uj(u, <f>) lies at the boundary of the 
domain. Two cases must be considered: 
a) If the type of advertising is such that 24 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
A e ( -0,-^-t 
then 4/3w0-#
2</>-u; > 0 by assumption A2, and the boundary may be 
explicitly rewritten using the strictly increasing and convex function 
48u - 0
2 ' 
Plugging this function into the expression of ufa, <f>) we obtain that 
fii(w) obeys the equation: 
- _ (
tt ~ m)(43u ~ 0
2) 
and since the function given in (15) is strictly increasing and concave, 
we have that 
sup. Ui(u>) = hm.u-tooUi(u) = . 
7 
Thus, sup. ui(uj) < m <=» assumption Al holds, which it does, 
b) Similarly, if 
Ae("27
M)' 





4(2/3. - 7)[(2/3 + 7)(4/3
2 - 7
2)w - /3(2/3A + 7A)(0 - A)] 










- t \ y ~ I \ {<*-rn)2B  sup. Ui(u!) = lim.fcj^ooWj^j = — < m 
7 
by assumption Al. This completes the proof of the proposition. A COURNOT SETTING  25 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Given the investments («¿,04) pre-
committed by each firm i at the first stage of the game, the equilib-
rium at the second stage is the one defined by equation (9) in the 
text. Thus, the long-run payoff function for each firm i is defined by: 
9i(-) = PM-)}
2 -4n
2-cual t = 1,2, (17) 













By solving the 4x4 system of equations defined by (18)-(19) and 
substituting the solution into equation (9), the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the entire two-stage game is obtained. The description 
of such an equilibrium is completed with the price of each good, given 
by 
Pi = 




2^ - 3(206 + 7A)
2^ - 40
3w] 
for each firm i 
The stability of the first-stage equilibrium (ûit is ensured by 
assumption A2. Finally, the inferiority of such an equilibrium is 
proved in the same way as for the (tij, a^-strategies m proposition 
1. This completes the proof of the proposition. | 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Comparison of the equilibrium values 
of R&D and advertising in the two-stage game with respect to the 
one-stage game yields: 26 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Ûi =• St <^=> w(2/? +7)7 + ^(0- A) =• 0, (20) 
and 
Ôî = âi i6(2/3 + 7)(2/?A + 7e) -/3A = 0, <=1,2. (21) 
Finally, the proposition follows from (20) and (21), the assump-
tion A2, and the relationship between ratios 
^ and ^. 
Ui Ui 
This comparison between («*, Oj) and (uj, Oi) levels is depicted in the 
following figure. 
Figure 1 
Levels of investment in (ûi, ài) with respect to (ûu ài), i = 1, 2 A COURNOT SETTING 27 
Taking as the benchmark the investments undertaken by each 
duopolist i in the game r(uit ai,qi), figure 1 may be divided into 
several regions: 
• Case 
Under this type of advertising the way to have a soft competitor 
at the market subgame is to overinvest both in m and a* (region 5 of 
figure 1); or to overinvest in m and to invest in a* the same quantity 
as in the one-stage game (region 4 of figure 1); or to overinvest in ut 
and underinvest in a, (region 3 of figure 1); or to invest in Ui the same 
level than in the one-stage game and to underinvest in a* (region 2 
of figure 1); or even to underinvest in both Ui and m (region 1 of 
figure 1). A commitment located in regions 4 or 5 (both marked by 
circles), in which a* > a, despite the fact that such an advertising is 
highly cooperative, reflects that interaction between R&D and adver-
tising offsets or outweighs the 'direct-strategic effect' of advertising. 
For that, parameter w must be high, whereas parameter <j> must be 
low. On the other hand, a commitment located in regions 1 or 2 (each 
one also depicted with a circle), in which Uj < uit arises when effects 
of underadvertising (in the decreasing of the marginal profitability of 
rival's R&D and advertising) outweighs or offsets effects of underin-
vestment in R&D (in the increasing of the marginal profitability of the 
rival's advertising and R&D). For that, parameters u and <f> must be 
low enough. 
• Case 
In this case, each firm is located, in terms of R&D and advertising 





When advertising investments are of this type the only way for 
firms to get a strategic advantage is to overinvest in both Ui and at 
(regions 5, 6 or 7 of figure 1), given the substitutability that exists in 
all the relationships between R&D and advertising expenditures. 28 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Separation of 'direct-strategic effects' from 'indirect-strategic ef-
fects' of each investment in the differential effect between both regimes 
of competition follows from the FONCs of the first stage of the game 
r((«i, fli), <?i), given in equations (11) and (12) in the text. By apply-
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i= 1,2; j = 3-i, 
where H 
H dqtdui dqjdqi d<*i' 
0
2 - 7
2 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of 




is the increasing or complementarity effect that the use of u. (respec-
tively, ai) causes on a, (respectively, on Ui). 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (22) captures 
the marginal effect of m on qj} and the product of such a factor by 
dlXi 
dq~j~ 
represents the 'direct-strategic effect' of cost-reducing investment. If 
a conventional negatively sloped demand exists and R&D investment 
reduces the marginal cost of the output, then 
> 0 
dqidui 
when zero or low enough spillovers prevail; 
d\i 
dqidqj 
< o, A COURNOT SETTING  29 
for substitute goods; H > 0, by stability of the Nash equilibrium of 
the second stage; and 
which encourages overinvestment in cost reduction in the absence of 
any advertising investment. This parallels the conclusions of Brander 
and Spencer (1983) and De Bondt and Veugelers (1991), among others 
(see result 1 in this paper). 
The second term on the right-hand side of (22) represents the 
marginal effect of m on qj via the other long-run variable, au and the 
product of such a term by 
gives us the 'indirect-strategic effect'. When it is negative and suffi-
ciently large (in absolute value), the 'direct-strategic effect' may be 
outweighed and therefore undercommitment in cost reduction may 
occur. Indeed, this happens when advertising increases the rival's 
residual demand and its productive efficiency is high enough. 
Similar considerations with regard to advertising investment fol-
low from the analysis of equation (23). 
Explicit results for the model we have can be obtained by apply-
ing the mean value theorem to the FONCs given in equations (18) and 
(19), by which we obtain: 























is the 'total-strategic effect' of the advertising investment, Ait* = 
in -ii.Aoi = 04 -Oi, and 
___(.) and —(.) 
5aj dui 
are evaluated at some point in the region defined by (uj.aO and 
(m, Hi). The resolution of the 4x4 system defined by equations (24) 
and (25) yields 
A,, = ~ ^ - WW + - ^
9 -














2(2/30 + 7A)(2/3-7) 
+ 7^2 2








:W - 8(200 + >y\)(20 - 7)(« -\)<f> - 20
2(20 - 7)w]. 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (24') is the con-
tribution of cost-reducing expenditure to the direct output-mediated 
effect ('direct-strategic effect'), which is related to the efficiency of ad-
vertising. This 'direct-strategic effect' is positive, which means that 
Am* > 0. A COURNOT SETTING 31 
The second term on the right-hand side of (24') measures the 
contribution of cost reduction to the output-mediated effect via ad-
vertising ('indirect-strategic effect'). It is positive when 
7 
A > 0, 
20 ' 
which reinforces the 'direct-strategic effect' ensuring that AUi > 0, 
and is higher than in the absence of advertising. On the other hand, 
if 
A < -—6, 
26 
then the 'indirect-strategic effect' is negative and outweighs the 'di-
rect-strategic effect' when w is sufficiently low, in which case Aw* < 0. 
In turn, if 
A < - — 9, 
20 
and w is large enough, then A«j > 0 but smaller than in the absence 
of advertising. 
Similar considerations with regard to equation (25') help us to 
explain the firms' advertising behavior. 
The conduct of firms in output terms in the two-stage game with 
respect to the one-stage game is such that: 
qi =. qi <=> <f.(2/3A+70)(0-A)+w7 =• 0, i=l,2, (26) 
by which it follows that when 
A < --Le 
20 
and w is low enough compared with <f> in such a way that 
u < (9- A)(7g-2/?A) 
<f> 7 
then ^ < q^, if 
w {9- \){19-28\) 
4>
> 7 
then ^ > q^, if 32 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
w _ (0- A)(7fl-2/?A) 
0 ~ 7 
then & = Q-M and, on the other hand, if 
. 7 „ 
> ~~9rt ' 
then ?i > ft. Finally, the pattern of firms' profits in each regime 
of competition moves in the opposite direction compared to the out-
put. 1 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. When the duopolistic industry is socially 
managed, the social planner has, as the objective function, the total 
welfare function, W, defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and 
the firms' profits, i.e.: 
W(-) = (a + 8ai-Xaj-m+ui)qi (27) 
+ (q - Xa, - 9aj - m + Uj)qj - ^(0q





2), ¿=1,2; j = 3-i 
His goal is to choose uitai and qit i = 1,2, so as to maximize this 
function, given the existing duopolistic market structure. Hence, his 
(non-strategic) behavior is characterized by the resolution of FONCs 
system: 
O=^ = ft-20Wi, (28) 
0= ^- = eqi-Xqj-2u!ai, (29) 
and 
0 = — = a + eai- Aa7- - m (30) 
<9<7i 
+u» -- 79j, i = 1.2; j = 3-i. 
The resolution of this system of equations yields the socially effi-
cient levels of cost-reducing effort, demand-creating advertising, and 
output for each firm. These are given by: A COURNOT SETTING  33 
a — m  Uu( ,a( ,q{
b)= __(Wi(fl-A)^2^) \,i= 1,2, (31) 
where F = 2(3 + 7)w0 - {0 - A)
20 - w. 
The stability of such an equilibrium, as well as the interiority of 
(u{
b, af^-strategies are proved as just in proposition 1. 
From here, we can compare investments of a duopoly devel-
oped in one- and two-stages games with those of a socially managed 
duopoly. 
• Comparison between (ui)0i) and (u{
b,a{
b). By comparing 
levels of proposition 1 with (u{
b, a{
b)-\eve\s given in (31) we have 
oj = a{
b 2{39- (23 + 7)A]0 + A = 0, ¿=1,2. (33) 
From (32) and (33) and considering the relationship between 
fb 
— and %• ratios, the following occurs. 
Ui u{
b 
a) m < u{
b and ai < a{
b when A < 0 (region 1 of figure 2), A = 0 
(region 2 of figure 2) or 
that: 
Ui — u{ <=s> 23io — X(9 — A) — 0, i— 1,2,  (32) 
and 
A € 0  9 (region 3 of figure 2). 
b)If 






 * = -2W=WTt)xY 
then ûj < u{





three cases must be considered: 
d.l) If 

























X, then û4 = u/
6 and a* > of (region 6 of figure 2); 
d.3) If 
(
G~ A)A THEN /FA ,6 N ? OF E 2, 
2/3
 1 1 
This comparison between (uu Si) and (u/
6, of
6) levels is illus-
trated in figure 2, where regions 4 and 6 are both indicated by a 
circle. 
• Comparison between (Ûitâi) and (u{
b,a{
b). Comparison between 
(ûi, ôi)-levels of proposition 2 and (u{
b, of )-levels given in condition 















<  +0(20+-y)\ - 0, i = 1,2. 
Figure 2 
Leve/s o/ investment in (uit ài) with respect to 
(u{
b, a{
b) levels, i = 1, 2 
The result is as follows. 











< u - and at < a 
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b)When 
U0
















then ú¿ < u{







. —r~ I 










3)0 - (803 + 6/3
27 - 7
3)A
 ;  
then Û( < u{



















three cases must be distinguished: 
d.l) If 
0(20 + 7)(0 — A)A „ 
W > 40* - 20^ - 7
3 '
























This may be illustrated in a similar way as in figure 2 and com-
pletes the proof of the proposition. | 